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  1 
Implementing Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives 
 
While a number of different theoretical models have been advanced to explain why states 
implement, or indeed, do not implement, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), 
very little empirical work has been undertaken to validate their predications. With a view 
to narrowing this gap, the present paper adopts a large-N, econometric approach to test 
the explanatory power of four distinct models of compliance – domestic adjustment, 
reputational, constructivist and managerial – in the context of European Union (EU) 
environmental policy. Using data on the number of official infringements received by 15 
member states for non-implementation of environmental directives over the period 1979-
2000, we find that all four models contribute statistically significantly to explaining 
spatio-temporal differences in legal implementation. Thus, our results suggest that the 
implementation of MEAs is shaped by a combination of rational calculations of domestic 
compliance costs and reputational damage, domestically institutionalized normative 
obligations, and legal and political constraints. We conclude by suggesting a greater need 
for multi-causal theoretical models of supranational legal compliance.  
 
  2Introduction 
 
The past three decades have witnessed the rapid proliferation of multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs). Indeed, judged by the number of MEAs, the period 
since the Second World War has been a spectacular success for proponents of 
multilateralism
1. Less successful, however, has been the implementation of these 
agreements. While many governments have been willing to join MEAs, evidence 
suggests that they have not always fully honoured their legal obligations to put 
supranational commitments into practice, i.e., by incorporating treaties into domestic law, 
promulgating regulations, and establishing an adequate monitoring and enforcement 
infrastructure
2. The result has been a complex geography of legal compliance
3, 
characterised by spatial and temporal variations in the implementation of multilateral 
environmental policies.  
Such variations have not escaped the attention of academics who have advanced a 
number of theoretical models to explain why states comply, or indeed, fail to comply, 
with their legal obligations to implement MEAs. Most relevant in the present context are 
what are broadly termed the domestic adjustment, reputational, constructivist and 
managerial models. Within the literature, each of these theoretical models (or 
approaches) is advanced as providing a distinctive account of variations in states 
(non-)compliance with multilateral legal obligations. In reality, however, many scholars 
                                                 
1 Mitchell 2003 
2 Faure and Lefevre 2005; Hønneland and Jørgensen 2003; Raustiala 2001; Sands 2003; Weiss and 
Jacobson 1998 
3 In the present paper, we use the terms legal compliance and implementation interchangeably  
  3accept that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive
4. Rather, as argued in the 
literature
5, different models focus on different aspects of non-compliant behaviour, and 
therefore should be seen as potentially complimentary.  
Yet, despite no shortage of theoretical debate
6, very little empirical work has been 
undertaken to evaluate whether all four models contribute statistically significantly to 
explaining variations in the implementation of MEAs
7. To be sure, existing research has 
found evidence compatible with elements of each model. Consistent with the domestic 
adjustment model, empirical studies have identified high economic compliance costs as a 
major factor impeding states’ implementation of MEAs
8. Similarly, past work has found 
that reputational concerns have underpinned countries’ efforts to faithfully implement 
multilateral environmental commitments
9. Empirical support for the constructivist 
perspective, which emphasises the role of socialization, learning and norms in fostering 
implementation of MEAs, has proved more elusive. Yet the influence of normative 
factors has been documented in other contexts
10. Finally, confirming managerial 
expectations, past work has identified an important role for administrative capacity and/or 
quality in determining states’ ability to comply with MEAs
11. 
Based on different policies, methodologies and samples, however, it is difficult to 
draw comparable conclusions from these studies. While individually finding evidence for 
one or the other model, this hardly constitutes conclusive evidence that all four models 
                                                 
4 Beach 2005; Cardenas 2004; Knill 2001; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002; Simmons 1998 
5 See Underdal 1998 
6 Downs and Jones 2002; Neumayer 2001a; Underdal 1998 
7 Weiss and Jacobson 1998 
8 Economy 2004; Gupta 2001 
9 Comisso et al. 1998; Zhao 2005 
10 Beach 2005; Checkel 2001; Gulbrandsen 2003; Solomon 2006 
11 Aguilar-Støen and Dhillon 2003; Economy 2004; Hønneland and Jørgensen 2003; Jacobson and Weiss 
1998; Vogel and Kessler 1998 
  4are important determinants. Indeed, without controlling for the influence of other 
determinants, simply focusing on the relationship between implementation and individual 
explanatory models runs the risk of generating spurious results
12. 
We seek to overcome these shortcomings by including several variables – 
representing different theoretical approaches to explaining (non-)compliance with legal 
obligations – within a single econometric model. Our multivariate research design allows 
us to determine whether all four models are statistically robust predictors of 
implementation of MEAs. For example, it is quite possible that variables capturing 
predictions from managerial models might lose their explanatory power once variables 
associated with domestic adjustment, reputational and constructivist approaches are taken 
into account. Importantly, our multivariate, statistical approach also allows us to evaluate 
whether each explanatory approach adds in a statistically significant way to the overall 
explanatory power of the model. 
Our empirical focus is the implementation of European Union (EU) 
environmental directives. Although originally a predominantly economic agreement, the 
EU has gone on to develop a large number of environmental laws. We use quantitative 
techniques to evaluate the influence of ten hypothesised variables – chosen to examine 
models of legal compliance – on the number of legal infringements received by 15 EU 
states
13 for non-implementation of environmental directives. Testing theoretical models 
through the development and statistical analysis of hypotheses is a widely deployed 
approach in the social sciences. In the present context, it involves specifying independent 
variables believed to explain variations in state behaviour (i.e., the dependent variable), 
                                                 
12 Mitchell 2002 
13 The 15 members of the EU prior to the accession of 10 new states in May 2004 
  5derived respectively from different causal models
14. The explanatory power of the 
independent variables can subsequently be examined using various econometric 
estimation techniques.   
Quantitative approaches have been used in past studies to investigate the 
determinants of policy implementation within the EU, although none of these works has 
specifically examined environment-related directives
15. Outside the EU, only a handful 
of studies have applied statistical techniques to understand the conditions facilitating 
and/or impeding the domestic implementation of MEAs
16. Instead, the majority of studies 
– whether focused on EU environmental directives or other regional and/or international 
environmental agreements – have taken the form of qualitative case-studies, typically 
involving a small number of countries, policies and/or regimes
17.  
  Yet a large-N quantitative approach offers considerable advantages in the present 
context. Econometric estimations techniques allow us to investigate large numbers of 
cases, comprising multiple years, states and environmental policies. They therefore yield 
insights which are potentially more generalisable than small-N qualitative studies
18. This 
is of particular advantage in testing theoretical models of compliance where we are 
interested in clarifying whether specific causal relationships hold across a range of 
contexts
19. Inevitably, there are trade-offs in our approach, not least because of the 
limited availability of data. We cannot measure several institutional variables identified 
in the literature as potential correlates of MEA implementation and, furthermore, are 
                                                 
14 Young 2004 
15 Guiliani 2003; Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; Mbaye 2001; Perkins and Neumayer 2007; Zürn and 
Joerges 2005 
16 Miles et al. (1998) undertake cross-national statistical analyses of MEAs, although their focus is largely 
on effectiveness, rather than legal implementation 
17 Börzel 2003; Bursens 2002; Knill 2001; Wilson et al. 1999 
18 Haas 2000; Sprinz 2004 
19 Mitchell 2006 
  6forced to rely on several proxies which provide an imperfect measure of underlying 
mechanisms
20. Inevitably, these factors restrict our analysis, meaning that our results 
should only be read as indicative. Still, we believe that our quantitative approach makes a 
useful contribution to current understanding. Indeed, to our knowledge, our study is the 
first to use econometric techniques to explicitly investigate all four compliance theories – 
domestic adjustment, reputational, constructivist and managerial – within a single 
estimation model.  
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. The nature, enforcement and scale 
of member state implementation is outlined in section 2. Section 3 briefly describes four 
widely-discussed theoretical explanations for variations in (non-)compliance with 
supranational legal commitments and advances a number of hypothesised variables used 
to capture each of these approaches. Section 4 outlines our variables and estimation 
model. Results are presented in Section 5. Briefly, we find that all four models contribute 
statistically significantly to explaining spatio-temporal differences in legal 
implementation. That is, our estimations suggests that the implementation of EU 
directives is shaped by a combination of the rational calculations of domestic compliance 
costs and reputational damage, domestically institutionalized normative obligations, and 




Implementing EU Environmental Law 
 
                                                 
20 Mitchell 2002 
  7According to Mitchell, an MEA is an ‘intergovernmental document intended as legally 
binding with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing human impacts on 
natural resources.’
 21  MEAs vary considerably, both in terms of their number of 
participants, geographical scale, target issues and policy requirements. Yet common to 
the majority of agreements are a set of obligations, actions and constraints, which states 
consent to follow
22.  
In the present study, we focus on one particular intergovernmental agreement, or 
rather, set of agreements. Specifically, we investigate spatio-temporal variations in the 
implementation of a body of European law, collectively termed EU environmental 
policy
23. Although not entirely comparable with truly international environmental policy, 
EU environmental policy makes a useful test-case for scrutinising models of 
supranational legal compliance for three reasons. First, the EU has a well-developed and 
diverse set of environmental policies, straddling a range of issues, sectors and regulatory 
approaches
24. Therefore, the EU case has the potential to provide generalisable insights 
for a range of environmental regulations, capturing some of the diversity of MEAs 
currently in the international system. Second, unlike the majority of MEAs
25, data exist 
on the implementation of EU policy. Although not a precise measure, these data 
nevertheless provide an indication of the relative extent of legal implementation by 
member states, as given by the number of infringement cases launched by the European 
Commission for suspected non-implementation of directives. Third, the EU is a natural 
laboratory for comparative social science research. As a collection of countries with 
                                                 
21 Mitchell 2003, 423 
22 Sands 2003 
23 McCormick 2001; Weale et al. 2000 
24 Axelrod and Vig 1999 
25 Sprinz 2004 
  8important shared characteristics, but which differ along a number of recognisable and 
well-documented dimensions, the EU provides researchers with an excellent opportunity 
to identify the determinants of cross-national variations in state behaviour. Indeed, 
differences in member state implementation of EU environmental policy have previously 
been used to derive wider lessons about the determinants of MEA implementation
26. 
Our specific focus in the present paper is the most important instrument of 
European environmental policy, namely, the directive. In common with many “hard law” 
MEAs, European environmental directives do not automatically become part of a state’s 
legal system
27. Rather, in order to become operational, they must first be transposed into 
domestic law by competent national and/or subnational authorities. Likewise, directives 
only specify the broader goals and objectives of environmental action, a characteristic 
shared with many MEAs. The precise ways and means to achieve these obligations are 
left to competent authorities
28.  
While granting states considerable discretion, such flexibility also increases the 
opportunities for non-compliance with Treaty obligations
29. In extreme cases, 
governments can ignore directives altogether, although this is rare
30. More commonly, 
non-compliance arises from the late, incomplete or incorrect transposition of directives 
into national law; or else, the failure of competent authorities to establish adequate 
implementation and enforcement mechanisms
31. 
                                                 
26 Vogel and Kessler 1998; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002  
27 Jacobson and Weiss 1998 
28 McCormick 2001 
29 Bursens 2002 
30 Dimitrakopoulos 2001 
31 Grant et al. 2000 
  9Under Article 211 of the Treaty of Rome, legal responsibility for ensuring 
compliance with directives falls to the European Commission
32. The Commission 
monitors the implementation of EU law by individual member states. In cases of 
suspected non-implementation, it also initiates infringement proceedings. Invariably, 
these proceedings begin informally, with a series of bi-lateral negotiations between the 
Commission and the concerned state. Typically, this is sufficient to settle legal disputes, 
with the majority of suspected breaches of EU law resolved without formal recourse
33. 
Where dialogue and mediation fail to produce a satisfactory conclusion, 
proceedings may move to a formal stage, comprising three sequential steps. In the first, 
the Commission sends a ‘formal letter of notice’, detailing the grounds of the suspected 
infringement, and inviting feedback from the concerned member state. If a satisfactory 
response is not forthcoming, the Commission may deliver a ‘reasoned opinion’, laying-
out the Commission’s view of how member state action remains inadequate, and 
establishing a deadline to rectify the infringement. Failure to comply with the reasoned 
opinion may result in the case being referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
In reality, only a small proportion of actual legal breaches result in infringement 
proceedings. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that member states frequently 
implement directives late, without evoking a formal investigation by the Commission
34. 
However, because there is little concrete evidence to suggest that the detection and/or 
prosecution of non-compliance is systematically biased against particular member 
states
35, it is possible to use the number of infringement cases as a relative measure of 
                                                 
32 Hattan 2003 
33 Davies 2001 
34Pagh 1999 
35 Börzel 2001 
  10legal implementation between member states
36. Indeed, national infringement counts 
have been adopted as the dependent variable in several recent statistical studies of 
member state compliance with European law
37, although none of these studies 
specifically investigates environmental directives.  
In the present paper, we similarly make use of infringement statistics, and 
specifically, the annual number of reasoned opinions against individual member states for 
non-implementation of environmental directives. We opt for reasoned opinions, since of 
the three possible stages, they best capture differences in genuine breaches of EU law 
related to member states’ willingness and/or ability to comply. Thus, reasoned opinions 
largely exclude ambiguous infringements arising from misunderstandings between the 
member state and the Commission, but equally, do not simply count the most persistent 
and intransigent cases of non-implementation that end-up in the hands of the ECJ. Table 
1 reports the number of reasoned opinions related to environmental directives issued to 
individual member states – aggregated into three-year averages to smooth over yearly 
variations – for the period 1979-2000. The table shows that all states have been the 
subject of proceedings. Yet it also reveals considerable variations in the number of 
breaches of EU environmental law, both within, and between, different member states 
over time.  
While we use these variations in infringement proceedings in the present paper to 
further understanding of the conditions under which states implement MEAs, it is 
important to note that the EU case is unique in several respects. Most notably, 
environmental directives are legally enforceable by courts at the national and European 
                                                 
36 Bursens 2002; Sverdrup 2004 
37 Guiliani 2003; Mbaye 2001; Perkins and Neumayer 2007 
  11level
38, although as with other MEAs, legal disputes within the EU are often resolved 
through mediation
39. Additionally, the states comprising the EU are arguably less diverse 
– in terms of their administrative capacity, cognitive setting, etc. – than is the case for 
truly international MEAs. Yet, in many other respects, EU environmental policy and non-
European MEAs share important similarities. Both are characterised by spatio-temporal 
variations in implementation
40, both require participants to make potentially costly 
domestic adjustments, both make demands on states’ legal, political and bureaucratic 
apparatus, and to a greater or lesser extent, both appeal to states’ normative obligations to 
ensure compliance. Hence we believe that the EU case contains important, generalisable 
lessons for MEAs both at the regional and international level.  
 
 
 <<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
Deriving Theoretical Predictions 
What explains variations in the implementation of MEAs? Why do certain states fully 
implement environmental agreements, while others do so incompletely, or not at all? At a 
theoretical level, a number of theoretical models (or approaches) have been advanced to 
answer such questions.  We focus on four widely-discussed approaches in the present 
paper, namely, domestic adjustment, reputational, constructivist and managerial. In 
                                                 
38 Readers should note that the assumed superiority of binding vis-à-vis non-binding forms of supranational 
environmental law remains a subject of ongoing debate, see Victor (2006) and Skjærseth et al. (2006) for 
relevant insights 
39 Faure and Lefevre 2005  
40 Yet, as in the EU case, it is important not to overstate the scale of implementation failure. See Chayes 
and Handler Chayes 1993; Neyer 2004 
  12reality, considerable diversity exists within each of these explanatory schools, as well as a 
degree of overlap between them
41. Still, it is possible to identify a number of distinctive 
assumptions underpinning each approach, although we readily admit that not everyone 
would agree with our definitions. 
In the rest of this section, we detail each of these models, and moreover, 
formulate hypotheses designed to capture the dynamics of each model. The text is 
structured into four parts, corresponding to individual theoretical exaplanations. We 
begin with domestic adjustment approaches.  
 
Domestic adjustment  
The domestic adjustment model
42, takes its cue from theories of rational choice. Thus, 
adherents of domestic adjustment-type explanations conceptualise states as rational, 
calculative and self-interested actors, who make implementation decisions by weighing-
up the material costs and benefits associated with compliance. A central prediction is that 
adjustment costs imposed on domestic stakeholders are a key factor influencing the 
implementation of legal commitments
43. As the costs of implementing policy rise, so it is 
suggested that actors face growing incentives to delay, dilute or even ignore their legal 
obligations
44. These dynamics are potentially significant in the present context to the 
extent that the costs of implementing multilateral environmental commitments are likely 
                                                 
41 See Checkel 2001; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002; Sterling-Folker 2000 
42 For examples of this reasoning, see Börzel 2003; Underdal 1998; Vogel and Kessler 1998 
43 Beach 2005; Jacobson and Weiss 1998; Tallberg 2002; Underdal 1998 
44 Börzel 2003 
  13to vary spatially and temporally
45. We expect two such factors to influence the costs of 
implementing EU environmental directives. 
The first is the level of ambient environmental quality, with overall compliance 
costs likely to be higher in states with a higher pollution load, not least because of the 
need for larger investments in abatement equipment
46. Of course, EU environmental 
policy is extensive, covering a range of media, resources and discharges. However, 
directives governing pollution emissions and/or ambient standards are likely to be 
especially susceptible to domestic resistance, owing to the fact that they have historically 
impacted politically influential groups comprising citizens (i.e. voters) and industry
47. A 
second – and closely related – factor influencing compliance costs is manufacturing-
intensity. Manufacturers have been the target of a large number of EU environmental 
policies, many of which have potentially significant cost implications
48. While 
agricultural producers have also been subject to environmental directives, such policies 
have often been accompanied by offsetting payments. We therefore expect, all else equal, 
manufacturing-intensive states to encounter higher overall compliance costs in seeking to 
implement environmental directives.  
Together, the above suggests that regulated parties in heavily polluted and/or 
manufacturing-intensive states will be more likely to “mobilise” against the introduction 
of new environmental policies. This, in turn, increases the risk of legal infringements as 
politicians and regulators respond to pressures from non-state actors to defy, delay and/or 
dilute environmental directives. Manufacturers are likely to be especially influential in 
                                                 
45 Downie 2005 
46 Zito 2000 
47 The importance of business opposition in undermining the effective implementation of supranational 
environmental policy obligations is well documented in the literature, e.g., Weinthal and Parag 2003 
48 Grant et al. 2000 
  14this respect
49 since they have received comparatively few side-payments from the EU 
and are typically represented by strong and well-organised lobby groups
50.  
Hence:   
  
Hypothesis 1.  The higher the pollution load, the lower the implementation of 
environmental directives. 
  
Hypothesis 2. Implementation will be lower where manufacturing-intensity is higher. 
 
Reputational 
A second broad approach, which we label reputational, is most often associated with 
theories of neoliberal institutionalism
51. In common with domestic adjustment 
approaches, reputational ones assume rational, calculative and egoistic behaviour. 
However, the latter widens the scope of self-interest, focusing on external reciprocity, 
strategic legitimacy and reputational calculus. Thus, states comply with their legal 
obligations anticipating that the long-term costs from non-compliance in terms of 
reputational damage outweigh any short-term gains
52. More positively, it is suggested 
that compliance offers states an opportunity to prove their credentials as reliable and 
legitimate partners in co-operative ventures, with potentially positive payoffs for 
economic, political and military security
53.  
                                                 
49 Of course, manufacturers do not always oppose new environmental policies (e.g., see Wurzel 2002). Yet, 
across the majority of environmental directives, we expect the predominant pattern to be one of resistance. 
50 Grant et al. 2000 
51 Downs and Jones 2002; Keohane 1984 
52 Simmons 1998 
53 Chayes and Handler Chayes 1993 
  15Within the EU context, we argue that such concerns are likely to be especially 
important for recent entrants. Keen to prove their credentials as “good” European 
citizens, and therefore dependable collaborators in EU affairs, newcomers will make 
greater efforts to faithfully implement environmental directives
54. Moreover, recent 
entrants are likely to anticipate higher losses from reneging on their Treaty commitments. 
Thus, against a backdrop of limited reputational capital, newcomers will be concerned 
about the negative ramifications – for example, in terms of reduced political influence 
within EU decision-making institutions – arising from a widely-publicised record of non-
compliance with European law.  
Long-established member states, on the other hand, are unlikely to rely so heavily 
on compliance for their legitimacy, standing and reputation. Their position as legitimate 
members of the EU is frequently taken for granted, owing to their founding status and/or 
long history of political engagement. Indeed, confident of their standing and with an 
accumulated stock of reputational capital, long-term members may be tempted to 
prioritise the protection of domestic economic interests over the legal goals of EU 
integration
55. 
These predications are consistent with theoretical expectations, which emphasise 
the importance of faithful compliance amongst new states for signalling their reputation 
as reliable partners in future co-operative ventures
56. They are also in line with the 
literature on Europeanization which emphasises the strategic intent of new accession 
states to gain legitimacy
57. Additionally, our expectations are supported by empirical 
                                                 
54 Guiliani 2003 
55 Olsen 2002 
56 Downs and Jones 2002 
57 Lægreid et al. 2004 
  16evidence. Several qualitative studies therefore document how concerns to nurture 
international legitimacy and a reputation as cooperative and responsible actors have led 
several developing and transition countries to make concerted efforts to fully implement 
MEAs
58. More specifically, the idea that more recent entrants to the EU should have a 
better record of implementing directives is supported by past quantitative work, which 
has found a positive relationship between membership length and number of legal 
infringements
59. 
Another claim made in the literature is that the significance of reputational capital 
is influenced by power status. Underlying this argument is the idea that more powerful 
states command international legitimacy and influence on account of their political, 
economic and/or military size, lessening the strategic importance of reputation for co-
operative ventures. Along similar lines, it is claimed that powerful countries are more 
autonomous, in that they are better able to resist international pressures to comply 
exercised by supranational organisation, non-governmental organisations and other 
sovereign states
60. 
Applied to the EU context, these insights suggest that more powerful members 
will be better positioned to defy costly and/or disruptive EU environmental laws
61. Their 
economic, political and environmental weight means that influence in EU affairs is 
unlikely to depend greatly on their reputation as faithful implementations. They can, in 
other words, afford to defect. At the same time, powerful states are less likely to face 
hostile responses from fellow member states, and particularly weak ones. Fearing 
                                                 
58 Comisso et al. 1998; Zhao 2005 
59 Guiliani 2003; Mbaye 2001 
60 Cardenas 2004 
61 Sverdrup 2004 
  17negative economic and/or political consequences, weak states might be expected to avoid 
threatening their self-interests by mobilising shame against their larger, more powerful 
counterparts. 
Conversely, unable to rely on economic and/or political power for influence, 
weaker states are likely to depend to a far greater extent on their reputation as 
cooperative, reliable and committed member states. Indeed, their ability to wield political 
influence may crucially depend on doing so. An important corollary is that less powerful 
states faces greater incentives to establish and maintain a reputation as good European 
partners through the timely and/or proper implementation of EU law. 
A similar argument has been applied to explain the greater propensity of larger, 
more powerful member states to breach the Stability and Growth Pact rules of European 
Monetary Union
62. Specifically, it is claimed that smaller states are less able to afford the 
loss of reputational capital arising from non-compliant behaviour compared to their larger 
counterparts. Likewise, the ability of the US to defy international environmental law has 
been attributed to its hegemonic status, which has allowed domestic elites to resist 
external pressure for compliance
63. Hence we expect more powerful states to violate EU 
environmental laws more frequently, an expectation consistent with past quantitative 
studies into the implementation of all directives
64.  
 Summing-up:   
 
Hypothesis 3. More recent entrants to the EU will have a better record of implementation 
of environmental directives. 
                                                 
62 Buti and Pench 2004 
63 Falkner et al. 2004 
64 Mbaye 2001; Sverdrup 2004 
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A third approach used to explain (non-)compliance with legal obligations, constructivism, 
emphasises the normative basis of compliance
65. According to constructivists, choices 
governing legal implementation are fundamentally guided by norms, beliefs and rules, 
which collectively provide the foundation for individuals’ interests
66. Constructivist 
accounts adopt a process-based ontology
67. Hence, it is suggested that normative 
commitments are not prefigured, but are frequently learnt, internalised and embedded 
through a process of transnational engagement
68. Accordingly, constructivists predict that 
compliance happens where legalised norms are internalised, meaning that they ‘resonate 
and are considered legitimate locally’ (Cardenas 2004, 215), and therefore become 
institutionalised into accepted practice
69.  
Within the recent literature, considerable importance has been attached to the 
normative identities, preferences and beliefs of civil society
70. Thus, it is suggested that 
civil society plays a pivotal role in embedding, mobilising and sanctioning normative 
obligations at the domestic level. Constructivist scholars within the European context 
have similarly emphasised the importance of national publics in determining the 
                                                 
65 Sterling-Folker 2000 
66 Beach 2005; Chayes and Handler Chayes 1993; Faure and Lefevre 2005 
67 Palan 2004 
68 Kostakopoulou 2005; Underdal 1998 
69 Cardenas 2004, 215 
70 Cardenas 2004; O’Neill et al. 2004 
  19normative “pull” of European law
71. One claim is that positive citizen values, attitudes 
and beliefs towards Europe
 enhance the domestic legitimacy of EU forms of polity and 
governance
72. In doing so, they increase political actors’ acceptance of EU legal norms, 
‘…as being legitimate and part of the ‘law of the land’’ (Beach 2005, 124), and working 
from a “logic of appropriateness”
73, their implementation of directives as a matter of 
normative obligation
74. Indeed, these ideas are consistent with notions of 
Europeanization which emphasise the cognitive basis of institutional change
75. Hence we 
expect countries in which the public are more supportive of the EU, in the sense of more 
approving of its existence, modalities and actions, will be the subject of fewer 
infringements for non-implementation of environmental directives.   
Yet it is not only civil society which is widely implicated in the domestic 
incorporation of compliance norms. For constructivists working within an International 
Relations tradition, national political elites internalise new and/or strengthened normative 
commitments through ‘participation in a norm-governed process’
76. Involvement in 
international polity, politics and policy, in particular, is believed to support social 
communication, learning and the development of new normative understandings. What 
this suggests is that countries’ involvement in international and/or regional environmental 
agreements might plausibly shape compliance. With a history of international 
engagement, signatories to multiple MEAs might be expected to have reconfigured their 
preferences further from unilateralism, recognising that they hold common interests and 
                                                 
71 Checkel 2001; Laffan 2001 
72 Mbaye 2001 
73 March and Olsen 1979 
74 Dyson 2000; Laffan 2001 
75 Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002 
76 Raustiala and Slaughter 2002, 546 
  20stand to gain from common solutions. As a result, they are more likely to be accepting of 
the normative force and legitimacy of multilateral governance, and therefore comply with 
resulting obligations
77. Indeed, it seems improbable that signatories to multiple MEAs 
would be peculiarly adverse to EU directives on the grounds that they represent an 
unacceptable challenge to national sovereignty
78. More specifically, domestic political 
actors in states which are party to larger numbers of MEAs are more likely to have 
internalised norms regarding environmental policy as a legitimate and worthwhile focus 
for multilateral policy intervention, fostering institutionalised compliance behaviour. We 
therefore anticipate that the implementation of environmental directives and states’ 
cumulative experience of MEAs will be closely linked. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 5. Implementation of environmental directives will be better the higher the 
approval rate of the EU in a member state’s population. 
 
Hypothesis 6. Signatories to a larger number of MEAs are likely to have a better record 
of implementation.  
 
Managerial  
Even where states are compelled, coerced and/or obligated to implement international 
law, however, there is no guarantee that they will be able to do so
79. A fundamental claim 
of the fourth and final approach considered here, the so-called, managerial perspective, is 
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  21that compliance problems may continue to arise on account of various constraints
80. In 
reality, managerialist accounts capture a broad set of dynamics, several of which are 
potentially compatible with domestic adjustment, reputational and constructivist models. 
We restrict our focus here to three constraints widely discussed in the literature on 
supranational legal implementation and compliance. The first is the domestic political 
structure. A popular argument is that the number of political veto points has an important 
influence on the implementation of multilateral agreements. Underlying this belief is the 
observation that veto players may oppose the introduction of new supranational policy 
requirements, and therefore their incorporation into national law
81. Since the likelihood 
of delays is likely to rise with the number of veto players in government, we expect 
political executives in states that are more constrained by the existence of veto players to 
find it more difficult to implement multilateral policy requirements. This prediction is 
supported by case-study evidence
82, together with recent statistical analyses of EU 
directives, which have found that states with more veto players have been subject to more 
formal infringement proceedings
83.    
  Another constraint hypothesised to impede compliance with supranational legal 
commitments is a country’s domestic legal system, traditions and culture
84. According to 
several scholars, implementation is likely to run into opposition and/or delays where legal 
systems are more litigious, complex or tolerant of non-compliance
85. Conversely, where 
a country’s legal system settles disputes quickly, is respectful of international law and/or 
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  22compliance-orien ted, implementation will proceed more smoothly
86. Within the EU, it is 
the Nordic states whose – Scandinavian – legal system, traditions and culture embody 
these characteristics most closely
87. Indeed, their peculiar approach towards conflict 
management and norms of faithful compliance with international law have previously 
been identified as factors underlying the comparatively low number of infringement 
proceedings raised against them, particularly beyond the formal letters stage
88. 
  A third set of constraints are administrative in nature. A common suggestion is 
that making the adjustments required to implement multilateral environmental policy 
commitments depends on administrative capacity, including an adequate supply of 
lawyers, bureaucrats and scientists
89. Along similar lines, it is suggested that the quality 
of the administrative resources is also important
90. Of particular relevance in this respect 
is the ability of government departments, agencies and personnel to facilitate and/or 
action the steps – legal transportation, promulgation of regulations, creation of 
enforcement agencies, etc. – required to implement treaty obligations. Indeed, these 
claims are largely consistent with past empirical studies, which have identified 
administrative capacity and/or quality as a constraint on the correct and/or timely 
implementation of both international MEAs
91 and EU environmental directives
92. We 
therefore expect states with weak and/or inefficient bureaucratic capacity to encounter 
more difficulties in implementing EU environmental law. 
Summing-up, then:  
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Hypothesis 7. Countries in which national governments are more constrained by veto 
players will have a worse record of implementing environmental directives. 
 
Hypothesis 8. States with a Scandinavian legal system are likely to have a better record 
of implementation.  
 
Hypothesis 9. Greater administrative capacity renders implementation more likely.  
 
Hypothesis 10. Bureaucratic quality will be positively correlated with implementation.  
 
 
Empirical Research Design 
 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable – that is, measure of the extent to which states’ implement 
environmental directives – is the annual number of environment-related infringement 
proceedings taken against individual member states over the period 1979-2000. It is 
important to note that infringement data do not provide a true measure of the actual 
number of legal breaches committed by member states in any one year. Instead, 
infringements only record cases of non-implementation detected by the Commission, and 
moreover, currently under investigation; whether or not the breach was committed during 
  24that year. In reality, these comprise a fraction of the overall number of legal breaches by 
member states
93.  
Providing that “unrevealed” cases are randomly distributed across the sample, 
however, they should not invalidate the use of infringement data as a measure of legal 
implementation. Börzel  investigates this assumption and finds little evidence for the 
existence of systematic bias
94. Thus, neither societal activism nor state monitoring 
capacity – two factors that could plausibly bias the detection and reporting of non-
implementation between countries – are correlated with the number of national 
infringements received by individual member states. Similarly, she finds no consistent 
relationship between country rankings by total infringements to any of the factors – state 
power, level of Euro-scepticism, etc. – previously hypothesised to influence the 
Commission’s willingness to pursue formal proceedings. These observations do not 
entirely rule out the possibility of systematic bias, but do at least indicate that several of 
the potential biases sometimes mentioned in the literature
95 may be relatively 
unimportant. 
Of the possible infringement stages, we opt for reasoned opinions. Our choice was 
guided by a number of considerations. First, unlike formal letters, reasoned opinions 
exclude a substantial share of infringement cases arising from ambiguities and 
misunderstandings between the member state and the Commission
 96, neither of which 
are relevant in the context of our four explanatory models. At the same time, reasoned 
opinions do not exclude potentially instructive cases of non-compliance, as is the case 
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  25with ECJ referrals. Only the most intransigent cases of non-implementation end-up being 
referred to the ECJ, meaning that they fail to capture a large number of genuine breaches 
settled earlier on
97. Indeed, precisely because there are very few ECJ referrals, and 
therefore limited variability in the data, they are poorly suited to econometric analysis.  
 
Independent Variables 
Beginning with domestic adjustment costs, our measure of a country’s pollution 
performance (H1) is the average per capita pollution load index (PLI) for carbon dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides and sulphur dioxide emissions
98. The PLI index measures the average 
emission load per capita relative to the EU average in percentage terms. Values above 
(below) zero mean higher (lower) than average EU pollution load
99. For example, a value 
of 80 means that the country’s per capita pollution load was 80 per cent above the EU 
average, whereas a value of –20 means that it was 20 per cent below EU average. Ideally, 
we would have liked to use a more comprehensive measure of pollution load, going 
beyond air pollution. However, such data are unavailable for our period of study, with 
comparable indicators for water only available from 1990 onwards. Still, it is plausible to 
assume that a country’s per capita air emissions will be closely correlated with other 
forms of pollution. As our measure of the manufacturing-intensity of a country’s 
economy (H2), we take the manufacturing value-added share of GDP
100. 
With regards to reputational variables, our measure of membership length (H3) is 
the number of years the country has been a member of the European Union or its 
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  26predecessors. We take the natural log of this variable since we believe that the number of 
years will have a decreasing impact on countries’ non-compliant behaviour. In order to 
measure a country’s power status (H4), we use population size
101. Because it is unlikely 
that a country’s power status will have a linearly increasing influence on its ability to 
shirk treaty obligations to implement EU environmental directives, we take again the 
natural log of this variable.  
Moving on to our variables capturing expectations derived from constructivist 
theories, we measure public approval for the EU (H5) using the percentage of the 
population stating that membership of their country in the European Union is “a good 
thing”. Data are taken from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002
102. For 
our measure of engagement with MEAs (H6), we use the percentage share of multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) a country has ratified
103.  
In order to measure managerial restrictions imposed on executive authority by the 
domestic political structure (H7), we use an index of political constraints developed by 
Henisz
104. Building on a simple spatial model of political interaction, the index captures 
the structure of government in a given country, together with the political views 
represented by different levels of government. It measures the extent to which political 
actors are constrained in their future policy choices by the existence of other political 
actors with veto power. A dummy variable captures the effect of the prevailing 
Scandinavian civil law system in Denmark, Finland and Sweden (H8). Rather than 
lumping all the remaining countries together, we allow for more flexibility in the 
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  27estimations by further distinguishing between French civil law (Belgium, France, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), German civil law (Austria and 
Germany) and Common law (Ireland and United Kingdom) countries. With a set of 
exclusive and complete dummy variables, one dummy needs to be omitted from the 
estimations to serve as the reference category. In our case, this is the Scandinavian civil 
law dummy
105.  
We measure administrative capacity (H9) using per capita income expressed as 
gross domestic product in purchasing power parity and constant US$,
106. Although an 
indirect measure, it makes sense that states with greater wealth should command (all else 
equal) more administrative resources to implement environmental directives, an 
assumption confirmed in past empirical studies
107. Our fourth managerial variable, 
bureaucratic efficiency (H10), is measured using a score provided by the International 
Country Risk Guide
108, which runs from 1 (worst) to 4 (best). These data are only 
available from 1984 onwards, meaning that we use the 1984 value for prior years. 
However, because there is little variation in expert assessments of bureaucratic quality 
over time, this should not represent a big problem.  
Additionally, we include a control variable to account for the so-called 
“newcomer” effect, whereby new entrants have historically been exempted from 
infringement proceedings for a period of approximately two years
109. Granted by the 
Commission in recognition of the difficulties faced by new member states in adjusting to 
a large number of directives, we expect the newcomer effect to have a negative influence 
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  28on the number of infringement cases. Our dummy variable is set to one for the first two 
years of EU membership. Table 2 provides summary descriptive variable information.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
Estimation Model 
We estimate the following model 
 
yit = α + β1xit + γtTt + uit
 
The subscript i represents each member state of the EU in year t, y is the number 
of reasoned opinions and x is the vector of explanatory variables. The year-specific 
dummy variables T are of particular importance in the context of the present study, 
capturing general developments common to all member states, but changing over time. 
They include annual increases in the number of environmental directives and other 
regulations, both of which might plausibly impact member state compliance
110. They also 
include changes in the Commission’s willingness to pursue infringement proceedings 
against member states
111, developments in the European legal regime for enforcing and 
sanctioning non-compliance
112, and institutional developments such as Treaty revisions 
and enlargement. Year-specific time dummies can control for all these developments, as 
long as they affect all member states approximately equally, without the need of formally 
modelling each factor. The uit is a stochastic error term.  
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  29Because the dependent variable is a discrete, strictly positive count variable, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is not well-suited as a regression technique, as its 
underlying distributional assumption is that of a normally-distributed continuous variable. 
A common technique for count data is an estimator based on the assumption that the 
underlying data is Poisson distributed. However, it implicitly assumes that the conditional 
mean and the variance functions of the dependent variable are equal. If this assumption 
does not hold, then Poisson regression is insufficiently conservative and hugely 
overestimates the significance of variables
113. We therefore use negative binomial 
regression, which is more flexible than Poisson, with standard errors that are fully robust 
toward arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. To deal with potential 
autocorrelation more directly, we also include the lagged dependent variable, but since it 
sometimes absorbs a large amount of variation of the data, we report two regression 





Table 3 shows our estimation results. With regards to our hypotheses, our findings are 
largely consistent with expectations. Thus, we estimate a positive, statistically significant 
relationship between manufacturing-intensity and number of legal infringements (i.e., 
reasoned opinions). Similarly, our estimated coefficient for air pollution is positive and 
statistically significant. That is, according to our estimations, states with a higher 
pollution load appear to have a worse record of implementing environmental directives.   
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<<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
With regards to variables measuring reputational motives, the estimations are 
consistent with expectations. Thus, we estimate a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between length of membership and legal infringements. Similarly, we find 
that population is positively and statistically significantly correlated with legal 
infringements, indicating that more powerful member states are more likely to ignore 
and/or defy environmental treaty obligations.  
Moving to constructivist variables, we find that public support for European 
integration is negatively and significantly correlated with the number of reasoned 
opinions, suggesting that governments of countries whose citizens hold favourable 
opinions of the EU are more likely to implement its environmental policies. We also find 
that states which are signatories to a larger number of MEAs have fewer infringements, a 
relationship which is statistically significant at the .01 level. Again, both results are 
theoretically consistent.  
Finally, with respect to managerial expectations, we estimate a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between political constraints and number of 
infringement cases. Likewise, as expected, all the non-Scandinavian legal systems 
(Common law, French civil law and German civil law) have statistically significantly 
more infringements than the countries with Scandinavian civil law traditions, the omitted 
reference category. Yet our other two measures of administrative constraints – namely, 
bureaucratic efficiency and administrative capacity – fail to assume statistical 
  31significance. It is worth noting that, while the two variables are correlated with each 
other, multicollinearity is not responsible for this result. Taking out one still leaves the 
other variable statistically insignificant
114. The results thus fail to confirm part of the 
expectations derived from managerial theories of compliance, as well as several recent 
case-studies
115. However, it may of course be that our highly generalised measures of 
administrative resources are a poor measure of the capacity/efficacy of a state’s 
institutions involved in implementing environmental directives. Unfortunately, more 
sector-specific measures of administrative resources – for example, the number of 
employees working in environmental protection agencies – are simply unavailable for our 
sample countries and years.  
Our dummy control variable for newcomer status is statistically significant with 
the anticipated positive sign. This is the only variable that becomes marginally 
insignificant when the lagged dependent variable is included in the estimations. 
Otherwise results are robust toward inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, which 
itself is statistically insignificant. 
What can we say about the relative explanatory power of each theory? Because 
the negative binomial is not a linear regression, one cannot use a measure of fit such as 
adjusted R-squared. Instead one needs to employ statistical information criteria such as 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). 
Similar to adjusted R-squared, these information criteria assess the goodness of fit by 
assessing the explanatory power of non-linear models with reference to their log-
likelihood, adjusting for the fact that models with more explanatory variables will usually 
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  32fit the data better. The criteria differ in the extent to which they penalize model 
complexity (more variables typically explain more variation in the data
116). If only the 
variables of each theory are entered into a regression on their own, then the managerial 
model has the lowest AIC and BIC, followed by the domestic adjustment, constructivist 
and reputational models
117. Since lower AIC and BIC values are preferred, this would 
suggest that the managerial model is the most and the reputational model the least 
preferred. However, such a comparison assumes that the explanatory models are mutually 
exclusive, which, neither in theory nor in reality, is necessarily true. A more pertinent 
question might therefore be whether each theory adds to the overall explanatory power of 
the model. One can test with the same criteria whether dropping the variables from any 
single model from the regression that includes all variables leads to a more preferred 
model. The test results suggest that dropping the variables of any one of the theories 
would lead to a less preferred model according to both AIC and BIC
118. The conclusion 




Discussion and Conclusions 
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118 The full model has an AIC of 1176.0 and a BIC of 1304.4. Dropping the domestic adjustment model 
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raises the AIC to 1189.9 and the BIC to 1311.2. Excluding the managerial model variables increases the 
AIC to 1211.5 and the BIC to 1318.5. Finally, dropping the constructivist model variables raises the AIC to 
1187.5 and the BIC to 1308.8. In all cases, the nested, more parsimonious models have higher AIC and BIC 
than the complete model, which renders the complete model the preferred one 
  33While scholarship has gone a long way in resolving the question of why states sign-up to 
MEAs, far less is known about the reasons for differences in the implementation of these 
agreements
119. Indeed, when it comes to understanding why states do – or indeed, do not 
– comply with their treaty obligations to implement MEAs, it would be fair to say that 
theorisation has run ahead of empirical testing. Although scholars have advanced a 
number of theoretical models to explain differences in legal compliance, comparatively 
little research has been undertaken to empirically validate their respective predications
120.  
  In this paper, we seek to reduce this gap between theoretical and empirical 
understanding. To this end, we use econometric techniques to statistically test the value 
of four distinct theoretical approaches – domestic adjustment, reputational, constructivist 
and managerial – in explaining differences in the implementation of EU environmental 
directives. Our study makes a number of important contributions to current understanding 
of the conditions under which MEAs are (not) implemented. First, we provide systematic 
empirical support for the predictive power of two dominant rationalist explanations, 
notably, domestic adjustment and reputational models. While several authors have cast 
doubt over the idea that compliance decisions are subject to rational, calculative logic
121, 
our study suggests otherwise. Thus, we find that states with a higher share of 
manufacturing industry and/or air pollution load – characteristics which might plausibly 
increase the economic costs of implementing EU environmental policy requirements, and 
therefore opposition from governmental and non-governmental actors – have a worse 
record of implementing environmental directives.  
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  34Similarly, our statistical estimations validate predications derived from 
reputational models
122. Recent entrants to the EU club, who presumably face strong, self-
help motives to establish and maintain a reputation as “good” European partners, are 
more likely to implement environmental directives. Conversely, we find that more 
populous states have a worse record of compliance, a finding consistent with theoretical 
predications regarding the lower reputational penalty faced by more powerful states in 
defecting from treaty obligations. 
Compared with the preceding two explanations, constructivist accounts have 
largely been ignored in the empirical literature
123. Our findings, however, suggest that 
constructivist explanations are potentially instructive in understanding cross-national 
variations in the implementation of MEAs. According to constructivists, therefore, we 
should expect political actors to internalise wider societal norms in making 
implementation decisions. Presumably, this explains our finding that member states 
whose citizens hold more positive sentiments towards EU integration have fewer 
infringements. According to the same perspective, we should expect norms regarding the 
role of supranational governance and environmental protection to influence compliance 
activity. Again, this is consistent with our finding that member states who have signed-up 
to a larger number of MEAs have fewer infringements. 
Finally, our findings lend systematic, empirical support for managerial models of 
compliance, which emphasise various implementation constraints. Consistent with 
previous empirical work
124, we find that countries where political actors are impeded by 
the presence of veto players in national government are less likely to successfully 
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  35implement environmental policy. Similarly, we find that countries with a Scandinavian 
legal system have fewer infringements for non-compliance, presumably because of their 
less adversarial, compliance-oriented legal culture.  
Yet, while our estimation results corroborate past findings highlighting the 
importance of political and legal constraints
125, we find no support for the oft-made claim 
that administrative capacity and/or efficiency explains variations in the implementation of 
MEAs. Of course, it may be that our result is simply a product of our generalised measure 
of administrative resources, or alternatively, that our sample does not contain countries 
with very limited and/or inefficient bureaucratic capacity
126. Still, our results should 
caution against the widely-held assumption that implementation failures can be 
automatically blamed on administrative shortcomings. A similar conclusion has been 
reached by Börzel in her study of alleged non-compliance in Southern Europe
127. 
Taken together, our findings lead us to three key conclusions. First, the reasons 
for states’ implementation – or indeed, non-implementation – of MEAs are multiple and 
complex
128. Accepting our premise that insights from the EU case are generalisable, it is 
clear that variations in implementation cannot be reduced to a single variable, suggesting 
a need for multivariate explanations. Indeed, given that our study is limited by the 
number of quantifiable variables for which data are available, we expect the underlying 
determinants to be even more complex than portrayed here. In particular, we expect 
governance-related factors – such as national bureaucratic traditions, policy styles, etc. – 
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  36to account for some of the unexplained variations in compliance with environmental 
directives
129. A challenge for future research is to investigate the role of these contextual 
and institutional determinants using a large-N approach.   
A second important conclusion is theoretical and follows closely from the first. 
While different conceptual models of compliance – rational choice, reputational, 
constructivist and managerial – offer important insights into (non-)compliance with treaty 
obligations to implement environmental policy, they need not, and should not, be seen as 
mutually exclusive. By themselves, none of the models offers a satisfactory explanation 
for the observed variations in the implementation of EU environmental directives. 
Together, however, they provide a more complete account of variations in 
implementation. We are not the first to recognise this point
130. Yet our study is unique in 
providing statistical support for the value of four leading models of compliance in 
explaining cross-national variations in the implementation of supranational treaty 
obligations designed to protect the environment. Of course, this does not mean that 
different states comply for the same set of reasons, and that the above models will be 
relevant in understanding (non-)compliance in all instances. Rather, our study suggests 
that domestic adjustment, reputational, constructivist and managerial models offer 
important insights in understanding variations between countries in the degree of 
compliance with supranational policy commitments. 
A third conclusion centres on data. Our study examines a single example of 
supranational environmental policy implementation, and moreover, one with very 
specific characteristics. Yet recognising the variety of multilateral environmental 
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  37agreements, and associated governance structures, it would seem imperative to examine 
compliance models in a broader range of settings. Unfortunately, statistical work in this 
direction is restricted by a basic lack of data. We therefore finish by pointing to the 
urgent need to assemble new implementation datasets covering a wide range of MEAs, 
and furthermore, that include a number of different measures of compliance. 
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  49Table 1 
Number of Reasoned Opinions Issued (Aggregated over Three Year Periods)  
 
Year  1979-82 1983-85 1986-88 1989-91 1992-94 1995-97 1998-2000 
Austria  — — — — —  3  19 
Belgium  4 12  15  17 8 41  40 
Denmark  0 0 5 2 2 0  5 
Finland  — — — — —  3  11 
France  1  8 13 7 11  19  32 
Germany  0  5  22 10 25 16  22 
Greece  0  14 21 37 15 15  26 
Ireland  1  5  17 13 21 10  36 
Italy  8  8  33 34 29 21  42 
Luxembourg  5  4  15 11 12 11  16 
Netherlands  3  3  5 11  14 5  8 
Portugal —  —  0  10  17  40  46 
Spain —  —  4  25  18  33  28 
Sweden  — — — — —  2  8 
UK  2  3 12 6 15  10  28 
 
Source: Centre for European Integration, Free University Berlin. 
  50Table 2 
Descriptive Statistical Variable Information 
 
Variable Obs Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
# Reasoned opinions  262 4.62 5.42 0 30 
Air pollution load  262 22.85 58.41 -52 236 
% Manufacturing  262 22.95 6.12 11.47 43 
EU membership length (logged)  262 2.97 0.87 0 3.89 
Population (logged)  262 16.40 1.48 12.80 18.22 
EU approval rates  262 0.63 0.16 0.25 0.90 
% MEAs  262 0.75 0.16 0.45 1 
Index of political constraints  262 0.47 0.10 0.23 0.72 
Common law  262 0.17 0.37 0 1 
French civil law  262 0.60 0.49 0 1 
German civil law  262 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Bureaucratic efficiency  262 3.68 0.54 2 4 
GDP p.c.   262 18633 5174 9839 43844 
Period of grace  262 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 
  51Table 3 
Estimation Results  
 
Lagged dependent variable   0.000 
   (0.04) 
Air pollution load  0.003 0.003 
  (1.95)* (1.96)** 
% Manufacturing  0.039 0.042 
  (3.45)*** (3.74)*** 
EU membership length (logged)  0.234  0.208 
 (1.89)*  (1.68)* 
Population (logged)  0.415  0.416 
 (3.73)***  (3.75)*** 
EU approval rates  -1.751  -1.809 
 (2.94)***  (3.06)*** 
% MEAs  -3.521  -3.477 
 (3.36)***  (3.35)*** 
Index of political constraints  1.185 1.086 
  (1.90)* (1.76)* 
Common law  0.710 0.717 
  (2.45)** (2.49)** 
French civil law  1.434 1.446 
  (5.85)*** (5.87)*** 
German civil law  0.729 0.737 
  (2.57)** (2.62)*** 
Bureaucratic efficiency  0.167 0.162 
  (0.75) (0.73) 
GDP p.c.   0.000 0.000 
 (1.39)  (1.54) 
Period of grace  -0.729  -0.615 
 (1.78)*  (1.56) 
Observations 262  250 
Countries 15  15 
Note: Estimation is by negative binomial regression with robust and clustered standard 
errors. Constant and year-specific time dummies included, but coefficients not reported. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
  52